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1 Introduction  
This paper provides new information, not available from other sources, on the characteristics of 
the innovation process in Europe, and on the economic use and value of European patents. Our 
data are drawn from a survey (PatVal-EU, or PatVal for short) of 9,017 patents granted by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) between 1993 and 1997, located in France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (hereafter “EU6”). 
There is a rich literature on the measurement of innovation (for surveys see Griliches, 1990; 
Patel and Pavitt, 1995). Along with input data such as R&D expenditures and the human capital 
employed in research, patents have become the most common measure of innovation output (see 
Hall et al., 2001, for a survey). A convenient feature of patents is that they resemble innovation 
counts. Moreover, they have been well documented, especially in recent years thanks to the 
extensive on-line information that can be conveniently organized into databases. Another 
advantage of patents is that they can combine different indicators. For example, patent citations 
have been used to measure their importance and economic value (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et al., 
2005; Harhoff et al., 1999), or to describe the direction and geographical extent of knowledge 
flows among inventors and patent holders (Jaffe et al., 1993; Verspagen, 1997). Similarly, patent 
claims have been used to account for the scope of patent protection (Lerner, 1994). 
However, patents also have shortcomings. They relate only to certain types of innovations, and 
there are vast differences across firms, industries and countries in the precision with which 
patents measure innovation output. Moreover, there is still ambiguity about what exactly patent 
indicators measure. For example, some studies have shown that patent citations are a noisy 
measure of information flows (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Singh, 2005), particularly because 
many citations are added not by applicants, but by the patent examiners or just to avoid 
infringements (e.g. Alcacer and Gittelman, 2004; Harhoff et al., 2005). Also, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) show that it is hard to distinguish whether patent claims are a measure of 
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patent scope, degree of protection or of value. Similarly, citations are correlated with several 
aspects of the patent, e.g. its legal robustness and not just with its value.  
The patent data and indicators presently employed in the literature are drawn largely from patent 
documents. As a result, information not in the patent files is mostly unavailable. This implies 
that while certain aspects about patents or underlying innovation processes have been studied 
extensively, we have little or practically no information for others. For example, we do not know 
much about the inventors, or the nature of the research or other processes that gave rise to the 
invention; we typically have no measures of the value of the patent other than the proxies that we 
can retrieve from the patent document; and we know very little about whether the patent is used 
or not, whether it is licensed, or whether it is further developed into a new product by the 
applicant. 
The most natural way of collecting this information is through surveys. Griliches (1990) himself 
noted that patent surveys had not been undertaken for a long time. Since then, Scherer, Harhoff 
and Vopel conducted a patent survey in the US and Germany to explore the distribution of the 
economic value of patents (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; Harhoff et al., 2003b). The Yale survey 
(Levin et al., 1987) and the CMU survey (Cohen et al., 2000) investigated the motivations for 
patenting of US firms. Cohen et al. (2002) presented survey evidence on the role of patents for 
diffusing information in Japan relative to the US. Arundel and Steinmueller (1998) used the 
Community Innovation Survey to look at patents as information channels in Europe. While these 
surveys provide new data, they have limited European coverage and are mostly biased towards 
large companies.  
In order to overcome some of the weaknesses implicit in earlier studies, PatVal is a large-scale 
survey designed to be representative of the universe of patents in our EU6 countries. It covers all 
technological fields, deals with both for-profit and non-profit applicants, and collects information 
on small, medium and large business companies. In 2003, patents with the first inventor located 
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in one of our EU6 represented 42.2% of all EPO patents, and 88% of the EPO patents whose first 
inventor was in one of the EU-15 countries. PatVal’s main objective is to collect information 
about patents and the underlying innovation process on issues that had not previously been 
explored in depth because of lack of information in the patent documents. It also provides new 
proxies for variables like knowledge flows or patent value for which the present measures are 
subject to the discussions noted earlier. 
This paper is the first of a series of contributions based on the PatVal survey that explore these 
issues. It focuses on three areas: inventors; research collaborations and spillovers; use and 
economic value of the patents. In all of these areas, either the literature does not provide 
information on some relevant topic, or there is ambiguity in the existing measures, or the existing 
information is potentially incomplete. The three central sections of this paper discuss the PatVal 
data that fill some of these gaps. They all start with a brief discussion of the existing literature. 
Section 2 describes the survey and the data collected through the PatVal questionnaire. Sections 
3 to 5 are the central sections on the three topics above. The final section concludes and 
summarizes the results. Appendix 1 describes the methodology employed to carry out the PatVal 
survey. Appendix 2 provides our definition of the uses of patents. Appendix 3 describes our test 
for assessing the inventors’ bias in their answers about the patent value. 
2 The PatVal-EU survey 
The full-scale PatVal survey started in May 2003, and ended in January 2004. The questionnaire 
was submitted to the inventors of 27,531 patents granted by the EPO with a priority date of 
1993-1997, and located in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
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Kingdom. Appendix 1 describes the details of the questionnaire, the sampling strategy, the pilot 
tests, the problems faced during the survey, and the solutions that we adopted.1  
Our European inventors returned 9,216 questionnaires covering 9,017 patents.2 Table 1 shows 
the number of “contacted patents” (i.e., patents whose inventors received the questionnaire) and 
the final composition of the PatVal sample by country: 3,346 patents from Germany, 1,486 from 
France, 1,542 from the UK, 1,250 from Italy, 1,124 from the Netherlands, and 269 from Spain.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
There are two issues that we want to highlight at the outset of our discussion. First, because the 
distribution of the economic value of patents is very skewed, we increased the number of 
valuable patents in our sample by over-sampling patents that were either opposed under the EU 
opposition procedure before a patent is granted, or that were not opposed, but had received at 
least one citation by the time we sent out the questionnaires (May 2003). As we shall note in 
Section 5.3, both oppositions and citations are correlated with the value of the patents. Our final 
9,017 patents include 43.2% patents that were either opposed or cited while the population of 
EU6 patents with a priority date of 1993-1997 only has a share of 28.5% of patents of this type. 
With respect to the population, our sample will therefore over-represent patent characteristics 
that are positively correlated with opposition or citation. This problem did not turn out to be 
important when employing sampling weights that correct for the stratified sampling.3 Therefore, 
we report all of our results in this paper without correcting for over-sampling.  
                                                 
1 While the original target was to focus on the period 1993-1997, some patents with a priority date of 1998 crept into 
the sample. However, they are very few and we continue to consider the PatVal window as 1993-1997.  
2 The number of questionnaires is larger than the number of surveyed patents because we obtained responses from 
more than one inventor for 192 patents. Since the statistics in the paper are based on the number of patents, we 
randomly picked one questionnaire for each multiple-response patent. However, the multiple responses were used to 
check for the consistency of the information provided by different inventors. Clearly not all the questionnaires 
answered all the questions. Hence, there are generally some missing data for our variables.  
3 Using the computed sampling weights and correcting for non-response, we found that the corrected results do not 
differ substantially from the results presented in the tables and figures presented in this paper. Differences mainly 
concern a small share of patents at the very right-hand tail of the patent value distribution. Intuitively, this is due to 
the fact that even in the 28.5% of opposed or cited patents, there are only very few cases that several standard 
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A second issue arises because the respondents in our survey – inventors - may not be the best-
informed individuals with respect to all of our questions. Inventors are likely to have excellent 
information on their own biography and the invention process. For some PatVal questions, 
however, company managers might have been better informed – e.g., for questions on the value 
of the patents or their economic use. However, given the large scale of our survey, it would have 
been virtually impossible to find the best contact for each of the many applicant organisations in 
our sample to provide information about a given patent.4 The inventor’s address is in the patent 
document and, in addition, the inventor is a well-defined “type”. A generic person 
“knowledgeable” about the patent is a more blurred type. He could be a manager in the R&D, 
legal or other department, or the boss of the inventor, or the technology licensing manager in a 
university. Moreover, since we conducted the survey in 2003, our knowledgeable individual for 
a patent applied for in 1993-1997 might have no longer been employed in the organisation. If we 
sent the questionnaire to the organisation without checking who was going to answer, it would 
be unlikely to produce better estimates and response rates than asking the inventors. We 
concluded that the latter was the best option, at the scale of our survey, for systematically finding 
somebody who had a reasonably good knowledge about the specific patent in question. 
Furthermore, we also checked whether the inventors were knowledgeable enough to respond. 
Especially during the pilot tests (see Appendix 1), and particularly for the questions on the value 
of the patents and their use, we asked them explicitly whether they were sufficiently informed 
about the topic. In general, they had a pretty good idea of the answer. As discussed in Appendix 
3, on the specific question of the patent value we even produced a statistical test on 354 French 
patents for which we had an answer from both an inventor and a manager. We found that the 
inventors tended to over-estimate the value of their patents, but the bias is small.  
                                                                                                                                                             
deviations above or below the mean of the respective variable. As a result, by over-sampling opposed or cited 
patents we increase the share of these patents just by percentage points. Appendix 1 explains in greater detail our 
sampling procedures. The corrected tables and figures are available upon request. 
4 As we shall discuss in Appendix 3, we could do this only for the French questionnaire. 
  6
As a first snapshot of the PatVal sample, Table 2 describes the composition of the dataset by 
macro technological classes and by affiliation of the inventors. The PatVal patents are classified 
into 5 “macro” technological classes: Electrical engineering, Instruments, Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals, Process engineering, and Mechanical engineering.5 The survey also provides 
information about inventors’ employers: small firms (less than 100 employees), medium firms 
(100-250 employees), large firms (more than 250 employees), universities, public or private 
research institutions, and others.6  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
The percentage shares of the technological classes in Table 2 (left-hand column) show that 
Mechanical Engineering and Process Engineering are the most represented technologies in the 
EU6. As expected, the business sector and in particular, large companies, are the most common 
source of innovations. The business sector accounts for about 93% of all PatVal patents. 
Universities account for 3.2%, and other Public Research Institutions for 2%. Moreover, the 
importance of the large vs. small and medium firms differs across the EU6. The highest share of 
inventors employed in large companies is in Germany (79.9%), followed by France, Italy, the 
UK (all around 60-65%) and Spain (54%).  
3 Who are the European inventors? 
Who are the European inventors? What is their educational background? What are their 
motivations to invent? 
                                                 
5 We used the ISI-INIPI-OST classification system elaborated by the German Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and 
Innovation Research (ISI), the French Patent Office (INIPI) and the Observatoire des Sciences and des Techniques 
(OST). This classification distinguishes between 30 “micro” technological classes and 5 “macro” technology areas 
based on the International Patent Classification (IPC). For the concordance between ISI-INIPI-OST technological 
classes and EPO IPC classes, see Hinze et al. (1997). For the PatVal statistics across the 30 “micro” technological 
classes, see the PatVal Final Report (PatVal-EU, 2005). 
6 We adopted the European Commission’s convention that small-medium firms have fewer than 250 employees. 
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The economic and sociological literature has studied the determinants of researchers’ 
productivity. It has typically focused on scientists, showing that their productivity distribution is 
skewed (Lotka, 1926; Allison and Steward, 1974; Cole, 1979; Merton, 1968; Arora et al., 1998). 
Moreover, age and vintage matter. Scientists become less productive as they get older, although 
there are differences across research fields and over time (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Jones, 
2005). This is borne out after controlling for other observable characteristics of the individual. 
However, a lack of information on industrial inventors, particularly on their individual 
characteristics, has held back the study of their productivity. There is practically no large-sample 
empirical work on the matter. The few existing studies employ small samples. For example, 
Narin and Breitzman (1995) tested Lotka’s inverse square law of productivity in a sample of 
inventors in the R&D departments of four companies in the semiconductor industry. Similarly, 
Ernst et al. (2000) studied the inventors of 43 German companies. 
The PatVal survey provides a unique opportunity to explore the characteristics of individual 
inventors, such as their sex, age, education, motivations to invent, and job mobility. Table 3 
shows that the share of female inventors is remarkably low. Only 2.8% of the inventors in our 
PatVal sample are women. In Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals this share reaches 7.4%, while it 
drops to 1.1% in Mechanical Engineering. There is some variation across countries as well. 
Spain employs 8.2% female inventors, while Germany is the other extreme with only 1.6%. 
These shares are even lower than the already small share of women among higher education 
researchers in the EU-15. According to the European Science & Technology Indicator Report 
(European Commission, 2003), this share is 29% for all disciplines, 23% for science, and 12% 
for engineering. There is no reason to believe that PatVal systematically under-sampled women, 
as we carefully selected patents in ways that produced no bias that we could not control for. 
Moreover, even in the EU-15, the lowest share of women is in engineering, and patenting is 
frequently an engineering activity. Also, in PatVal the participation of women is higher in 
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Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, which is more science-oriented, and it is lowest in Mechanical 
Engineering, a typical engineering field.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
According to Commission data, female participation in science and engineering declines along 
the career path. Data on this phenomenon are scarce. However, Commission data show that the 
gap between the percentage of men and women in academia increases dramatically as we move 
from undergraduates, where the shares are similar, to doctoral students, assistant professors, 
associate professors and full professors, where the gap is huge. A similar effect might occur in 
patenting. Table 3 also reports that the average age of our inventors is 45, which suggests that the 
production of a patent occurs when people are no longer young researchers, at least in Europe. 
Only 5% of the inventors in our sample are younger than 30. More than 60% are between 30 and 
50 years old. About 30% are between 50 and 60, and only 5% are older than 60. Moreover, we 
find that there is little variation across technological classes and countries. If invention is a 
process that occurs when people have completed the initial stages of their careers, then women 
are increasingly left out, consistent with observed academic data in which they are gradually 
more and more under-represented in senior positions along the career path.  
To summarize, the low share of women inventors seems to be consistent with two other 
observations: the relatively low participation of women in engineering, and the reduced share of 
women along the career path. However, this does not tell us why women are less active in 
engineering than science, or about why they lose ground along their career path. We thus 
propose a new question for the growing literature on the gender gap in science and technology, 
most notably, why the gender gap is particularly marked for patent inventors. Our data also 
confirm that women provide a considerably unexploited potential of human capital in Europe. In 
addition, the PatVal data raise the question of why European inventors are relatively old. 
Unfortunately, there are no systematic data on the average age of scientists and researchers in 
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Europe, even though existing evidence suggests that they are relatively old, too (European 
Commission, 2003). Our data are consistent with this view. Moreover, the lack of variation 
across countries and technologies reinforces the perception that the reasons are institutional 
rather than technical or any other. Again, this suggests directions for further research on this 
matter. 
Table 3 also reports the share of inventors with tertiary education. Most European inventors 
(76.9%) have a university degree, but the share of inventors with a doctorate is only 26.0%. The 
shares of inventors with a university degree or a PhD vary among technological classes. The best 
educated inventors are in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals: 91.8% of them have a university 
degree, and 59.1% have a PhD. The least educated ones are in Mechanical Engineering: 66.3% 
have a university degree and 9.3% hold a PhD. The differences across countries (not shown in 
the Table) are even more pronounced. Germany has the largest shares of both tertiary-educated 
inventors (85.3%) and PhDs (35.2%). Spain, France, the Netherlands, and the UK are close to 
the EU6 share while Italy lags behind. Its share of inventors with tertiary education is only 
56.7%, and PhDs account for only 3.1% of all Italien inventors.7  
Recent contributions have noted that there is a positive correlation between researchers’ 
productivity and their mobility. They argue that inter-firm and intra-firm mobility serve as a 
mechanism for creating an accurate match of employee and employer characteristics (Liu, 1986; 
Topel and Ward, 1992). Moreover, the mobility of human capital produces knowledge spillovers 
across organisations (Klepper, 2001). In fact, the job mobility of European inventors is limited. 
As discussed in Appendix 1, we made a considerable effort to limit the potential under-sampling 
of mobile inventors, who are more difficult to trace because their patent address does not match 
                                                 
7 The hypothesis that cross-country differences depend on the technological specialisation of the countries is not 
supported by our data. The share of Italian patents in sectors like Mechanical Engineering or Electrical Engineering, 
which have the lowest share of PhDs, is not significantly larger than the share of German or Dutch patents in the 
same sectors (see the PatVal-EU Report, 2005).  
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the recent telephone directories that we used to find our inventors. We cannot completely rule 
out that PatVal data  contain a bias against mobile inventors, but we have restricted the problem.  
We discuss here the responses to the PatVal question that asked how many times the inventor 
changed job after the surveyed patent. Since the survey took place in late 2003, this is a 6-10 
year window. The furthermost righthand column of Table 3 shows that most inventors never 
changed job during this period. The EU6 share of inventors who never moved is 77.5%, with 
little variation across technological classes. There are differences, however, across countries (not 
shown in the table). The least mobile inventors come from Spain, where almost 90% never 
changed job, followed by Germany (83.1%) and France (82.3%). At the other extreme, 34.7% of 
UK inventors changed job at least once, followed by the Netherlands (30.1%). Most of the 
mobile inventors moved only once. The share of EU6 inventors who moved more than once is 
7.7%, and the share of inventors who changed employer more than 3 times is 0.8%. 
Finally, we investigate the motivations of inventors to invent. Table 4 reports six motivations, 
which we asked inventors to rate from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). We distinguished 
between social and personal motivations – i.e. effects of the patented invention on employer’s 
performance, personal satisfaction, prestige and reputation – and monetary rewards or career 
advances. The question focused on the patent under investigation. This is because some 
questions were specific to it, particularly whether the inventors obtained rewards for the patent. 
However, because these motivations are likely to be general, we interpreted them broadly as 
well. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
According to the surveyed inventors, social and personal motivations are on average more 
important than money or career advances (Table 4). The rankings are similar across the EU6. We 
cannot rule out that these results reflect aspects of social desirability, but in a tentative way, they 
suggest that industrial inventors have similar motivations as members of the scientific 
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community (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Our inventors might have been hesitant in declaring 
that they cared about selfish concerns like money or career, or they feared that their employers 
would learn of their answers and then remark that they were concerned about their performance. 
But even if our inventors were concerned about hiding their quest for money or career, or they 
wanted to flag their concern about their employer, they would not have given high marks to an 
independent question on personal satisfaction. 
We think instead that PatVal uncovers another interesting direction for further research. Both 
scientists and industrial inventors are creative individuals, and creative individuals have common 
characteristics, motivations and goals. We emphasise three similarities. First, as human capital 
becomes more important, the owners of this asset, whether scientist or inventor, care about 
things that enhance the perception of the asset’s value. Thus, prestige and reputation are 
important. In turn, this may be because of personal satisfaction like fame and glory, or for more 
instrumental reasons like the opportunity this creates for future monetary rewards. Second, an 
individual benefits from the growth of the organisation in which he works because this favours 
his own prestige, growth or visibility as well. This may then explain why our inventors care 
about the performance of their employer. Third, unlike other professions, creativity, the search 
for knowledge, and the ability to show that something is possible, can be personally enticing. 
Thus, scientists and inventors may engage in it simply for consumption purposes, which explains 
the importance of personal satisfaction.8 
Finally, Table 4 shows the percentage of inventors that received monetary compensations for the 
patent under investigation. In Germany a compensation scheme to reward inventors is 
established by law, which explains the unusually high share for this country. When German 
employers claim innovations developed by their employees, they have to compensate them 
                                                 
8 We also found that there are differences in the ranking of the motivations across macro technological classes. This 
is consistent with our discussion. Even in science, the scientific ethos is higher for instance in physics or other more 
traditional hard sciences.  
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“reasonably” on the basis of the expected value of the innovation, and following the guidelines 
provided by the German Employees’ Inventions Act passed in 1957 (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2006). 
In other countries there are no official rules, and any compensation stems from the specific 
incentive policies of firms. After Germany, (61.3%), the UK shows the highest share (28.2%). 
As we shall also see later in this paper, this is consistent with the UK’s greater degree of 
technological entrepreneurship. UK inventors may receive compensation associated with profit-
sharing or similar mechanisms which are more typical of smaller concerns. The lowest shares are 
in Italy (23.1%), the Netherlands (17.5%) and Spain (14.7%). In general, apart from Germany, 
and partly the UK, these figures show that employers rarely provide their inventors with 
monetary incentives. Table 4 also shows that, when these incentives exist, they are typically 
transitory. 
4 Collaborations, spillovers and sources of knowledge  
4.1 Sources of knowledge spillovers 
A growing literature has studied the sources of knowledge that firms and scientists use for 
invention and innovation, and the mechanisms with which they obtain this knowledge. One is the 
creation of formal and informal networks of collaboration among researchers or institutions. 
Knowledge spillovers, which are more intense when there is geographical proximity, also imply 
access to external knowledge, with implied benefits (Jaffe, 1986; Jaffe et al., 1993). Empirical 
evidence confirms the clustering of innovative activities and the geographical dimension of 
knowledge spillovers. Verspagen (1997) estimates their effect on firm and regional economic 
growth. In addition, there are sectoral differences in spatial clustering. Skilled- and R&D-
intensive industries benefit to a greater extent from co-location and knowledge spillovers 
(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
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In order to assess whether firms or research institutions rely on each other’s knowledge bases, 
and to measure the geographic dimension of this exchange, most contributions use patent 
citations. Jaffe et al. (1993) analysed the spillovers across geographically close inventors. 
Similar studies have been carried out for Europe (Verspagen, 1997; Verspagen and De Loo, 
1999; Verspagen and Schoenmakers, 2004). For the US and Japan, Branstetter (2001) suggests 
that knowledge spillovers are primarily intra-national in scope. Although interesting, the validity 
of these results depends on the reliability of patent citations as a measure of knowledge flows. 
However, this is not widely accepted. Jaffe et al. (2000) confirm that patent citations reflect 
knowledge spillovers as perceived by the participants, albeit with substantial noise. Also Jaffe et 
al. (1998) find that two-thirds of the citations to patents of the NASA-Lewis Electro-Physics 
Branch could be related to spillover effects. By contrast, Alcacer and Gittelman (2004) show that 
an important fraction of patent citations are included by examiners rather than by inventors. This 
makes patent citations a noisy measure of the extent and direction of the knowledge flows. 
Moreover, these contributions do not explain the sources of knowledge spillovers. Only some 
recent studies show that they are not unintentional, and that the rise of externalities depends on 
the complementary actions of economic agents (Zucker et al., 1998). Harhoff et al. (2006) even 
argue that European patent citations should not be used at all for spillover analysis, because 93% 
of these citations are generated by the examiner or search officer at the European Patent Office. 
The PatVal data allow us to consider the sources of spillovers and knowledge flows without 
resorting to citation measures. This section uses different indicators from PatVal to shed some 
light on these issues. It examines the importance of R&D collaborations among individuals and 
organisations, the role of geographical proximity to establish them, and the use of different 
sources of knowledge in the innovation process.  
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4.2 The role of collaborations in the production of innovations 
The patent document lists the names of the inventors. Only one-third of the PatVal patents 
involve a single inventor. Thus, a patented innovation is typically the result of team work. The 
patent document, however, does not indicate whether the collaborations are among inventors 
belonging to the same or different organisations, or give details of the type of collaboration they 
establish.  
Co-application (i.e. patents applied for by more than one organisation) is the only information 
concerning collaboration provided by the patent document. The literature has used this 
information to identify R&D collaborations, and to proxy for the sharing of intellectual property 
rights (Hagedoorn, 2003). However, there may be collaborations that do not end up in a joint 
application. At the same time, the information on co-applications does not provide any details on 
several features of the collaboration, like which inventor belongs to which organisation, or 
whether they all belong to the same one, or what the type of collaboration is. Moreover, as 
Hagedoorn (2003) himself points out, firms consider this type of partnering sub-optimal, due to 
the legal complexities involved in the management of intellectual properties across firm 
boundaries and international patent jurisdictions. Hagedoorn also shows that co-patenting is 
more frequent in chemicals and pharmaceuticals where patent protection is stronger and the 
scope for legal controversies is more limited. Therefore, apart from under-estimating the extent 
to which there is collaboration in R&D, the data on co-patenting may be biased towards specific 
technologies.  
The PatVal questionnaire asked the inventors whether some of their co-inventors belonged to 
other organisations. It also asked whether the patent was developed in collaboration with other 
partners and if the collaboration was among individuals or among institutions. These questions 
make it possible to uncover collaborations that are not “visible” from the patent document.  
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The first column of Table 5 shows that the EU6 share of co-applied patents in our sample is 
3.6%. It ranges between 5.4% for France and 2.8% for the UK. It is slightly higher in the second 
column where we include among the co-applicants companies belonging to the same corporate 
group. The third column reports the share of patents in which the inventor declared that some co-
inventors were from another organisation. This share is 15% for the EU6, which is substantially 
higher than the co-applied patents. This is a stunning result. It is also larger for the UK, and 
smaller for Spain and Italy. Additional analysis of our data revealed that the share of patents with 
external inventors is smaller for firms, and particularly for large firms (about 12%), as compared 
to non-profit research institutions. As expected, firms tend to internalise the innovation process, 
and to mostly coordinate internally the production of innovation and transfer of knowledge 
among inventors. We also found that firms, and particularly large firms, had a lower share of co-
applications. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The share of patents in which the inventors declare that there were collaborations with other 
institutions is even higher. Along with the higher share of collaborations with external inventors, 
this suggests that co-applications capture a small fraction of actual collaborations. Collaborative 
patents in the EU6 are slightly more than 20%, with the Netherlands reaching 34.5%, and 
Germany falling to 13.3%. The two furthermost righthand columns of Table 5 show that about 
three-quarters of the collaborations are of a formal nature. In the questionnaire we defined formal 
collaborations for the respondents as relationships based on well-defined contracts among the 
parties. Firms, and particularly large firms, exhibit a lower share of collaborative patents 
compared to research institutions and universities. 
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4.3 Geographical proximity an  exchange of knowledge among inventors 
Another factor promoting the exchange of knowledge may be geographical proximity. We 
compare the extent to which geographical or organisational proximity (i.e. affiliation to the same 
organisation) encourages collaboration. PatVal asked inventors to rate from 1 to 5 the 
importance of four types of interactions in the development of the patented innovation: (1) 
interactions with people in the inventor’s organization, and geographically close (who could be 
reached in less than an hour); (2) interactions with people in the inventor’s organization, and 
geographically distant (more than one hour distant); (3) interactions with people not in the 
inventor’s organization, and geographically close; (4) interactions with people not in the 
inventor’s organization, and geographically distant.  
Figure 1 shows the importance of the four types of interactions. Organisational proximity is the 
most important category. Interactions in the same organization are on average more important 
than interactions with people in other organizations, especially when they are geographically 
close. Figure 1 reports the total EU6 data, but we find the same pattern for all six countries 
individually. Surprisingly, interaction with geographically close individuals in other 
organizations is the least important form of collaboration. This is puzzling given the emphasis in 
the literature on the importance of geographical proximity for collaboration and knowledge 
transfer. Geographically localised spillovers may be more important in technological fields 
featuring small technology-intensive companies organised in clusters. We checked whether 
geographical proximity ranked differently across technological classes, but the importance of the 
four types of interactions in the five macro and thirty micro technological classes of the ISI-
INIPI-OST classification system does not change. We cannot rule out that geographical 
proximity and formation of technological clusters are less important in Europe than other regions 
of the world (much of literature pertains to the US), but our result is puzzling, nonetheless..  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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4.4 Sources of knowledge in the invention process 
The PatVal survey also asked inventors to rate the following sources of knowledge from 1 (not 
important) to 5 (very important): competitors, suppliers, customers, other patents, scientific 
literature, participation in conferences and workshops, university and public research labs. 
Figure 2 shows the average assessment of the importance of these sources.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Customers are the most important source of knowledge for invention processes, followed by the 
patent and the scientific literature. The prominent role of customers is consistent with a long 
standing view in the literature. The SAPPHO project developed at SPRU in the 1970s noted that 
the ability to understand user needs was the most important success factor in the production of 
innovations (Freeman and Soete, 1997), and this results is likely to apply to inventions as well. 
Similarly, the importance of a customer-active paradigm has been central in the work of Von 
Hippel (2005). The score of the patent literature suggests that the new patented inventions rely 
on earlier technological developments, and that the availability of information contained in the 
patents favours the circulation of knowledge. Moreover, it supports the use of patent indicators. 
If patents are an important source of knowledge, it makes sense to use patent citations to account 
for the importance of the patents or the extent of knowledge spillovers from the cited to the 
citing document. Similarly, the importance of the scientific literature is consistent with the use of 
patent indicators based on their citations to scientific sources.  
It is surprising that university and public research labs are the least important source of 
knowledge. In fact, the distance between academic inventions and commercial patented 
inventions is large in most industries. There can be many steps before the more academic 
knowledge becomes useful to firms. In this respect, users, customers, suppliers, patents, and 
more generally industrial sources of knowledge are more important. However, the high score of 
scientific literature suggests that the more academic knowledge is not unimportant per se, but the 
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links with universities or public research labs require effort and investment in establishing 
relationships. By contrast, scientific literature is readily available provided that one has the 
required absorptive capacity. In fact, because of a good deal of codification in scientific 
discourse, the scientific literature provides a relatively good access to relevant knowledge, and 
there is not much need for the more costly investments of searching for or linking to research 
labs. Certainly, actual links with a lab provide a good deal of tacit knowledge that cannot be 
absorbed just from reading the literature, but the effort to link to the research labs may be 
relatively less important because the scientific literature already supplies a good deal of the 
relevant information.  
5 The use and value of EPO patents 
5.1 The use of patents 
How do firms use their patents? Why are some patents exploited commercially, while others are 
licensed out, and yet others are not used? This section uses the PatVal data to answer these 
questions.  
The path between invention and the commercialisation of a new product or a new technology can 
be long and costly. Moreover, not all inventions and new technologies translate into 
commercially profitable innovations. Many patents are never exploited, and only a few of them 
yield economic returns. The decision whether to use a patent  and how to use it, depends on a 
number of factors. For example, the patent owner might not possess the downstream assets to 
exploit it. Most often, this occurs when the patent owner is a small firm, an individual inventor, 
or a scientific institution. In these cases, licensing becomes an option (Arora et al., 2001; Rivette 
and Kline, 2000). The large firms also have unexploited patents (Palomeras, 2003; Rivette and 
Kline, 2000). Some of them are used strategically to block rivals, to improve the company’s 
bargaining power in cross-licensing agreements, or to avoid being blocked by competitors (Hall 
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and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). The literature emphasises the policy implications of the 
private decision not to use a patent (Scotchmer, 1991; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). The 
strength of patent protection can increase the propensity to patent and reduce its use. Moreover, 
the social cost of not using a patent is higher when the patent has a broad scope. In this case the 
applicant is less likely to own the full set of heterogeneous assets and competencies that are 
required to exploit it in its many directions. Yet, patent ownership means that the patent holder 
can prevent others from using it in any of these ways (e.g. Merges and Nelson, 1990). Nagaoka 
(2003) reports data on the use of patents by large Japanese firms, and Cohen et al. (2000) show 
the motivations for patenting of large US companies with formal R&D departments. Both studies 
show that, apart from protection, licensing, cross-licensing and other strategic factors like 
“blocking patents” are important reasons for patenting. 
These issues need further empirical investigation. For example, the literature on licensing has 
focused on the industries in which licensing is more frequent, like computer, semiconductors, 
and chemicals (e.g. Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, for the semiconductor 
industry; Cesaroni, 2003; Grindley and Nickerson, 1996, for the chemical industry; Kollmer and 
Dowling, 2004, for the biopharmaceutical industry), or it has used data aggregated at the level of 
firms rather than individual patents (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006). In general, information on whether the individual patent is used or not, and 
how it is used is largely unavailable, especially for Europe, and especially at the cross-country 
and cross-industry scale of our study.  
Thus, PatVal provides a unique opportunity to explore these issues. It asked the inventors 
whether their patents were used for commercial or industrial purposes, or if they were licensed. It 
also asked them to rate the importance of different motivations for patenting (on a 1-5 scale), 
including licensing, cross-licensing and strategic reasons like blocking competitors. Appendix 2 
describes how we used these responses to define the following six uses of the patents:  
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1) Internal use. The patent is exploited internally for commercial or industrial purposes, it can 
be used in a production process or it can be incorporated in a product;  
2) Licensing. The patent is not used internally by the applicant, but it is licensed out to another 
party; 
3) Cross-licensing. The patent is licensed to another party in exchange for another patented 
innovation;  
4) Licensing & use. The patent is both licensed to another party and used internally by the 
applicant organisation; 
5) Blocking patent. The patent is used neither internally nor for licensing, and was applied for 
to block competitors;  
6) Sleeping patents. The patent is not employed in any of the uses described above. It may still 
have option value to the holder as an asset protecting a completely different technical 
approach, but it unfolds no blocking effect w.r.t. competitors. 
Table 6 shows that half of EU6 patents (50.5%) are exploited by the applicant organisation for 
industrial and commercial purposes. About 36% are not used. Of these, 18.7% are blocking and 
17.4% are sleeping patents. Finally, 6.4% of the patents are licensed, 4.0% are both licensed and 
internally used, and 3.0% are used in cross-licensing agreements. Table 6 also shows that there 
are differences across our five macro technological classes. However, they are not substantial.  
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
There are more interesting differences across types of applicants. Table 7 shows that large firms 
use 50% of their patents internally. They trade less than 10% of them, and about 40% are not 
used. More than half of the unused inventions aim at blocking competitors. The large share of 
unused patents by large firms is also likely to stem from their lower marginal cost of patenting. 
Because of their larger scale, they patent more often. For this reason, they create internal 
  21
divisions specialised in patenting or licensing, or they have specialised managers or assets 
dedicated to this task. They then exhibit a higher propensity to patent because of the fixed costs 
involved. As a result, they also patent minor innovations, which are less likely to be used. In fact, 
this is consistent with the lower share of unused patents by small and medium firms in Table 7 
(18% and 24% respectively). Moreover, while medium firms have a higher rate of internal use 
and partly a higher rate of licensing, small firms have a slightly higher rate of internal use than 
large firms, and a much higher rate of licensing. The latter is a notable difference. Overall, the 
small firms license out 26% of their patents and leave 18% unused, which provides a  striking 
contrast to large firms which license out only 10% and leave 40% of their patents unused.. This 
is one of the most remarkable findings of PatVal: firm size and firm type explain a large part of 
the variation in the extent to which patents are used or licensed. As expected, public or private 
research organisations and universities license a large fraction of their technologies and do not 
use them internally (e.g. Mowery et al., 2001).  
5.2 Entrepreneurship and patents 
The role of patents as the foundation of new enterprises is conceivably an important one. Patents 
may be associated with the creation of new firms in technology-based businesses and may thus 
contribute to more competition and more innovation. Many start-ups in biotechnology, 
semiconductors, instruments and chemicals use intellectual property as their core asset. Quite 
often a patent, or possibly a group of patents, represents the key element around which a start-up 
sets its entire business. As Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) or Arora and Merges (2004) have noted, 
when property rights are strong and well enforced, new companies are more likely to start up 
because they can specialise in developing the technology and selling it to other firms, without 
incurring the much higher costs and risks of investing in the large scale assets for production and 
commercialisation. Moreover, patents help them find financing or corporate partners because 
they provide an independent assessment of the value of the company’s competencies. 
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Recent contributions have studied these issues, mostly in the US. They have analysed the 
formation of spin-offs that use patents licensed from universities (Shane and Kharuna, 2003), 
large firms (Klepper, 2001), and venture capitalists (Gompers et al., 2005). Cross-section 
empirical evidence based on large data samples is limited, however. The evidence for Europe is 
completely missing.  
The PatVal survey asked inventors whether their patents were exploited commercially by 
starting a new company. Figure 3 shows the share of patents in the PatVal sample used to start a 
new firm by country and technological class. For the EU6, 5.1% of the patents give rise to a new 
firm. This share is larger in the UK (9.7%) and Spain (9.3%). It is smaller in Germany (2.7%) 
and France (1.6%). As a general remark, the share of UK patents that give rise to a new firm 
provides additional evidence of the peculiarity of the UK in several aspects of the innovation 
process. Along with the largest share of new firm formation, the UK has the largest share of 
licensed patents, of inventors with tertiary education and PhDs, and of patents by universities 
and research institutions in general. In terms of technological classes, the share of new firms is 
larger in Instruments (7.5%), followed by Process Engineering (5.6%) and Mechanical 
Engineering (5.4%). In Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals only 3.1% of the patents are used to 
create a new firm. One of the more prolific “micro” technological classes is Medical Technology 
with 10.5% of patents that gave rise to a new firm. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5.3 The economic value of patents. 
The literature has used indirect measures to estimate the monetary value of patents. They include 
the number of citations that patents receive after their publication (Trajtenberg, 1990; for a 
survey see Hall et al., 2001), the renewal fees paid by the patent holders to extend the patent 
protection (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986), the 
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number of backward citations to other patents and to the non-patent literature (Harhoff et al., 
2003a), the number of countries in which the patent is registered for protection, and the 
incidence of opposition and annulment procedures (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). In addition, 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) constructed a composite indicator of the quality of patents. 
Only a few studies have used survey-based information on the economic value of patents, but 
they are limited to specific countries (see, for German and US patents, Harhoff et al., 1999, 
2003a, 2003b; Scherer and Harhoff, 2000).  
PatVal asked inventors to produce their best estimate of the value of their patented inventions. 
More precisely, the inventors were asked to estimate the minimum price at which the owner of 
the patent, whether the firm, other organisations, or the inventor himself, would have sold the 
patent rights on the day on which the patent was granted. To improve the accuracy of this 
estimate we asked the inventor to assume that at the time of this counterfactual sale, he would 
have had all the information available at the moment in which he responded to the 
questionnaire.9  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the value of the PatVal patents by technological class. The 
questionnaire asked inventors to rank the present value of their patents in one of ten value 
classes, ranging from less than 30,000 Euros to more than 300 million Euros.10 Our results 
confirm the skewness of the distribution of patent values (Harhoff et al. 1999, 2003b; Scherer 
and Harhoff, 2000). Only 7.2 % of the patents in our sample are worth more than 10 million 
Euros, and 16.8 % have a value higher than 3 million Euros. A share of 15.4% has a value 
between 1 and 3 million Euros. The largest share of patents falls in the left-hand of the 
                                                 
9 The questionnaire was submitted in 2003-2004, which is 6-7 years after the application year of the latest patents in 
the survey. This is a sufficient time span for a good deal of the information about the use and value of the patents to 
become available. As noted in Section 2, the inventors may not be the most informed respondents about the value of 
patents. See our earlier discussion, and Appendix 3 which describes the test that we performed to assess this 
potential bias.  
10 Clearly, patent values are affected by our over-sampling of important patents. Yet, as noted, our correction 
produced very small differences because the over-sampling regards only a small share of patents at the right tail of 
the distribution.  
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distribution. About 68% of all our patents produce less than 1 million Euros, and about 8 % have 
a value lower than 30,000 Euros.11 We note that our intervals in Figure 4 were constructed to 
obtain a logarithm scale of the variable, i.e. the difference between the logs of the two 
boundaries of any interval (rather than their absolute values) is roughly equal. Thus, Figure 4 
shows the distribution of the log of the patent values. Since the log of a variable is more skewed 
than the variable itself, the actual distribution of patent values is even more skewed than the one 
in Figure 4.  
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
There are some slight differences in the value of the patents across technological classes. For 
example, innovations that are worth more than 10 million Euros are more frequent in Chemicals 
and Pharmaceuticals (11.7%) compared to all the other sectors and to the overall sample (7.2%). 
Correspondingly, only 58% of Chemical and Pharmaceutical patents generate less than 1 million 
Euros, while the same share for Electrical Engineering, Instruments, Process Engineering and 
Mechanical Engineering is about 70%. This confirms that patents are more valuable in chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals compared to mechanical and electronic technologies.  
6 Conclusions 
Apart from a few patent surveys with limited European coverage and mostly biased towards 
large companies, the managerial and economic literature has suffered from the limited 
availability of detailed and direct data on the characteristics of invention processes and the 
economic value of its output. The PatVal survey was designed to close this gap. Compared to 
previous surveys on patents, PatVal has a much broader coverage in terms of European 
countries, and in terms of types and size of the applicant organisations.  
                                                 
11 We cannot rule out that the inventors have over-estimated the values at the very left tail of the distribution. This is 
because it may be psychologically difficult for a respondent to declare that his innovation is worth nothing, or a very 
small amount. We address this problem in Appendix 3 of this paper. 
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The paper first described the characteristics of European inventors. It confirms the extremely 
limited participation of women in innovation activities in Europe: 2.8% of the total PatVal 
sample. In terms of educational background, about three-quarters of the European inventors in 
the PatVal dataset have a university degree. Only one quarter have a PhD, with Italy lagging 
behind in both categories. Moreover, the European inventors are not very mobile across jobs. 
More than three-quarters of the PatVal inventors never moved from their job in a window of 
about 10 years after they produced the patent for which they were interviewed. The UK exhibits 
the largest share of inventors (almost 40%) who changed job at least once during their career. 
PatVal offers new information about the motivation of inventors to invent. Typically, inventors 
consider monetary rewards and career advances less important than personal and social rewards, 
like personal satisfaction, prestige, reputation, and contribution to the performance of the 
organisation. As far as the invention process is concerned, only one-third of the patents are 
developed by individual inventors, suggesting that most inventions are the outcome of a team 
activity. However, the vast majority of co-inventors belong to the same organisation. Only 
15.0% of the EU6 patents are produced by teams of inventors affiliated with different 
organisations. At the organisational level, 20.0% of patents are developed in collaboration with 
other institutions. About three-quarters of these collaborations are formalised through specific 
contracts, as opposed to being established on an informal, non-contractual basis. Finally, by 
comparing the share of co-applied patents with the share of collaborative patents, a large fraction 
of collaborations does not result in joint patent applications. Since the latter (co-patenting by 
multiple applicants) is the only information on collaboration in the patent document, the 
available information in the patent files severely under-estimates the actual extent of 
collaboration in the development of patents. We therefore signal caution in interpreting co-
application patterns as a “true” measure of collaboration. 
Customers are the most important source of knowledge for the patented innovation, followed by 
other patents and the scientific literature. Competitors, participation in conferences and 
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workshops and suppliers rank next. Surprisingly, university and non-university research 
laboratories are the least important source in all of our EU6 countries. We also found that while 
“organisational proximity” (i.e. being in the same organisation) encourages interactions of the 
inventors with other sources of knowledge, geographical proximity does not influence the 
probability of collaboration when the researchers belong to different organisations. Geographical 
proximity is not important either for the technologies that are known for being characterised by 
geographical clustering. This might suggest that, when examined using a large scale sample of 
patents and inventions, the extent of localised geographical interactions for innovation is more 
limited than emphasised by the literature. In addition, it may be particularly unimportant in 
Europe. 
The survey also produced information about the use and non-use of patents. We find that about 
one-third of the patents are not used for specific economic or commercial activities (whether 
exploited internally or licensed). Of these about half are dormant, while the others are blocking 
patents. Moreover, only 13.4% of patents are licensed. The most interesting difference is 
between large and small firms. Small firms license about 26% of their patents and leave only 
18% of patents unused, while the respective percentages for larger firms are 10% and 40%. Since 
large firms presumably have lower patenting costs, they probably patent minor innovations as 
well which are less likely to be used. For the smaller firms, patenting costs are important, and 
they tend to patent only innovations for which they can obtain some returns. As an alternative 
explanation, it might be possible for larger firms to derive greater strategic value from marginal 
patents, e.g., by using them to deter entry. Moreover, the higher share of licensing by small firms 
is consistent with a growing literature suggesting that firms with limited downstream assets are 
more likely to exploit their inventions through technology trade. Finally, we confirm that the 
distribution of patent values is highly skewed, and only a few patents yield large returns.  
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Appendix 1. The PatVal-EU Survey 
The questionnaire. The PatVal questionnaire focused on the topics described in Section 2, and it 
was divided into six sections: A) Inventor’s Personal Information; B) Inventor’s Education; C) 
Inventor’s Employment and Mobility; D) The Innovation Process; E) Inventor’s Rewards; F) 
Value of the Patent. 
The sampling procedure. At the time of the survey our six countries covered 42.2% of the total 
EPO patents by country of first inventor, and 88.0% of the EPO patents with country of first 
inventor being one of the EU-15 (source: EPO EPASYS database). Patents were assigned to 
countries according to the location of the first inventor in the inventors’ list. The share of 
questionnaires submitted to inventors in each country depended on the country share of patents 
in the whole population: Germany 49.7%, France 19.5%, the UK 15.0%, Italy 8.5%, the 
Netherlands 6.2% and Spain 1.07%. We under-sampled the share of German and French patents, 
and over-sampled the patents invented in the other countries in order to have sufficiently large 
samples for all of them. Since our goal was to receive about 10,000, we set the following target 
responses by country: 3,500 for Germany, 1,750 for France, 1,750 for the UK, 1,250 for Italy, 
1,250 for the Netherlands, and 500 for Spain. The response rate in the pilot surveys helped 
decide the number of questionnaires to send to the inventors in each country to obtain returns 
close to the target. To improve the response rate, the EPO and the European Commission 
provided us with a cover letter for the questionnaire. 
Our population is composed of all the EPO granted patents with a priority date between 1993 
and 1997. This is because, if we sampled very “old” patents, it would have been difficult to track 
down the inventors or to find someone who remembered enough about the innovation process. 
By contrast, very “recent” patents might not carry enough information about their value and use.  
In the sampling procedure we took into account that the distribution of patent values is highly 
skewed. We therefore over-sampled the “important” patents, which we defined as patents that 
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were opposed or that received at least one citation. Without such an over-sampling we would 
probably end up with very few patents in the upper tail of the distribution of patent values. In the 
end we selected a stratified sample of 27,531 EPO patents that included all the opposed or cited 
patents in the 1993-1997 patent population, and a random sample of the uncited and unopposed 
patents. As noted in the text, the over-sampling procedure produced about 15% additional 
observations for the opposed or cited patents at an aggregate EU6 level (43.2%) compared to the 
initial population (28.5%). The full PatVal Final Report (2005) also reports individual country 
shares of opposed or cited patents in the population of patents with a priority date of 1993-1997 
and in the PatVal sample. 
A potential problem may arise with inventors of more than one EPO patent. If they had to fill out 
multiple questionnaires, they could decide to drop them all, producing a potential bias against the 
more prolific inventors. To avoid this problem, we sent a maximum of five questionnaires per 
inventor even if he/she was listed in more than five patents in our sample (very few cases). We 
also asked multiple patent inventors to fill out the complete questionnaire for only one patent, 
and to skip Section A (and possibly B and C) in the other patents. Whenever possible, we asked 
the co-inventors to fill out some of these patents, and we made a particular effort to convince 
multiple patent inventors to respond to the survey. 
Pilot surveys. We performed three pilot tests before running the full-scale survey. The aims were 
to choose the best method for submitting the questionnaire in each country (mail, telephone, 
internet) and to check whether the respondents understood the questions clearly. In the final pilot 
test we reproduced the conditions under which the full-scale survey would be performed.  
Searching for the inventors. A critical task of the survey was to find the recent addresses and 
telephone numbers of the inventors listed in the patents. We faced two problems. First, we 
needed the inventors’ telephone number to check for their address and to contact them for the 
telephone interviews. Second, many addresses of the “mobile” inventors at the time of the survey 
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had changed with respect to those listed in the patent in 1993-1997. During the pilot tests we 
designed a common set of rules to search for the inventors’ addresses and telephone numbers in 
the six countries.  
We started by looking for the address of the first inventor listed in the patent in telephone 
directories of each country involved. We obtained 64% “exact-matches”, i.e. the name-surname 
and address listed in the patent was the same as in the directories. These inventors could thus be 
easily found and approached.12  
However, we also had to find some non-exact matches to avoid biases against the mobile 
inventors. We searched for two types of “non-exact matches”: inventors with and without EPO 
patents after 1997. In the former case, if the address in the later patent matched the one that we 
found in the phone directory, we contacted the inventor before submitting the questionnaire. 
Clearly, this was not sufficient as it might produce a bias towards the mobile and productive 
inventors who produced later EPO patents. To trace inventors who did not have other EPO 
patents we performed the following search: 1) We checked whether the same name-surname was 
in the city at a different address. In this case, we called the person. If there were up to 2-3 
individuals with the same name-surname, we called all of them to find out who was our inventor; 
2) We searched for the same name-surname in the wider regional area and at the national level. 
Again, we called the person to find out whether he was the inventor (up to 2-3 people); 3) We 
used the address of the second or third inventors (if there were any) in our 1993-1997 survey 
sample of patents, and we asked them for information about the first inventor (including his 
address). Only if we could not find the first inventor, did we ask the second or third inventor to 
respond to the questionnaire; 4) We finally searched for the inventors in the US patent data, and 
we surfed on the internet for useful information. To achieve overall uniformity of the procedure 
we issued “Guidelines to search for inventors” that were distributed to all team members. 
                                                 
12 Some inventors listed the address of the organisation for which they worked. We then contacted the company and 
asked to interview the inventor. They were a few cases. 
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The UK showed some differences. First, exact-matches were only 18%, compared to 65% in 
France, 86% in Germany, 62% in Italy, 66% in the Netherlands and 89% in Spain. This is 
because in the UK people can choose whether or not they want to be listed in the telephone 
directory, whereas in the other countries they are listed without permission being asked. Thus, to 
obtain a number of responses comparable to the other countries, in the UK we had to send out a 
much larger number of questionnaires. They were sent to the address of the inventor listed in the 
patent. The returned questionnaires were clearly a subset of the inventors whose address matched 
that in the patent. We then performed an additional search following the steps above to avoid 
biases against the mobile inventors. In the UK we had the additional problem that directories do 
not report the full first name of the customers, making Steps 1, 2, and in part 3 above hard to 
perform, with a large number of telephone calls needed to find the right person.13  
Our final sample of 9,017 patents includes 7% responses from inventors whose exact address 
only matched a later EPO patent (after 1997), and 5% inventors without a later EPO patent, 
whose address was found with this procedure.14 The remaining 88% responses are exact 
matches. Because the average of exact matches is 64%, our full scale dataset under-represents 
the 36% non-exact matches. Also, we have no way to figure out whether the proportion between 
inventors with and without later EPO patents is really 7 to 5. Thus, we have to be careful about 
this potential bias in our data. However, the fairly high rate of exact matches (64% on average, 
but even above 80% for Germany or Spain) suggests that in Europe the mobility of inventors is 
not pronounced. Hence, the extent of this potential bias may not be dramatic. The problem may 
be more serious for the UK. 
The full-scale survey. In order to maximize the response rate, each team chose the methodology 
to apply to his country during the full-scale survey, and all the teams employed a “recall 
                                                 
13 See the PatVal Final Report (2005) for response rates, and several other details concerning the search for 
inventors, or questionnaire submissions.   
14 The differences across countries in the two percentages are small. 
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strategy”. Details of the specific country strategies for the interviews are in the PatVal-EU 
Report (2005). The full-scale survey started in May 2003. The last country to finish the 
interviews was France in April 2004.15   
Appendix 2. Definition of the six uses of the patents 
The definition of the “uses” of patents takes up five questions of the PatVal questionnaire. The 
first two questions ask (answers Y/N):16 
Q1) Has the patent been exploited commercially? 
Q2) Has it been licensed to an independent party? 
The other three questions ask about the motivations to patent (answers 1-5; 1 = not important; 5 
= very important): 
Q3) Has licensing for revenue purposes been an important motivation for this patent? 
Q4) Has cross-licensing been an important motivation for this patent? 
Q5) Has the goal of blocking competitors been an important motivation for this patent?  
We then defined: 
Internal Use (Only) = (Y, N) 
Licensing (Only)  = {(N, Y) ∪ [(Y, Y) ∩ (Q3 = 4-5)]} ∩ (Q4 = 1-3) 
License and Internal Use  =  (Y, Y) ∩ (Q3 = 1-3) ∩ (Q4 = 1-3) 
Cross-Licensing  =  [(N, Y) ∪ (Y, Y)] ∩ (Q4 = 4-5)   
                                                 
15 In each country a professional poll-company conducted one or more steps of the survey. Only the Dutch team 
performed all the tasks internally, while in France the survey was conducted by the Ministère de la Jeunesse, de 
l’Éducation Nationale et de la Recherche, and it started in September 2003.  
16 Both Q1 and Q2 allowed for a third response, viz. “No, but still investigating the possibility”. For this purpose, we 
lumped it together with “No”.  
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Blocking Patent  = (N, N) ∩ (Q5 = 4-5) 
Sleeping Patent  = (N, N) ∩ (Q5 = 1-3) 
The definition of the licensed-only patents takes into account the possibility that the respondents 
have interpreted the expression “exploited commercially” in Q1 as including either licensing or 
internal exploitation. Thus, apart from patents in which the respondent answered “No” to Q1 and 
“Yes” to Q2, our licensed-only patents include patents in which the respondents answered “Yes” 
to both Q1 and Q2, provided that they gave a high score (4 or 5) to licensing for revenue 
purposes as a motivation for patenting. Cross-licensing are licensed patents (i.e. Q2 = Yes) with 
a high score (4-5) to cross-licensing as a motivation.  
Appendix 3. Check for validity of responses: the French test 
We performed a statistical test to check the potential bias in the inventors’ responses. The 
opportunity arose from the French survey which was conducted by the Ministère de la Jeunesse, 
de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Recherche in Paris. The Statistical Department of the Ministry 
had extensive databases and information about applicant organisations that made it easier to 
contact them. As a result, unlike the other countries, in which all the questions were asked to the 
inventors, in the French case the questions about costs of the research, source of funding, use of 
patents, and value of the patent families were asked to the patent applicant and not to inventors. 
The question about the monetary value of the individual patent was asked to both inventors and 
companies. All the other questions were asked only to inventors. We then used for our test the 
question on the value of the single patent, which was asked to both. For this question the French 
questionnaire had 354 patents with valid answers by both inventor and applicant organisation.17  
We first found that the distributions of the value classes provided by the inventors and the 
                                                 
17 In France 587 patents had responses from both inventor and applicant organisation. However, for 233 of them 
there was no response to the value question by the inventor, the applicant or both, leading to 354 patents with valid 
answers from both. 
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managers overlap to a great extent. Moreover, a two-tail t-test did not reject the hypothesis that 
the two means are different for a p-value < 10%. Pride or other factors may induce inventors to 
boost the results of their work, and hence to over-estimate the value of their patents. If so, it is 
reasonable to employ a one tail t-test of the null hypothesis of no difference between the two 
means against the alternative that the mean response of the inventors is higher than that of the 
managers. In this case the null hypothesis is rejected at p < 5%, suggesting that inventors over-
estimate the value of their patents compared to managers. However, such an over-estimation is 
small. The PatVal-EU Report (2005) describes the details of these and other tests that we 
performed.  
We also compared the different responses between inventors and managers in small and large 
firms. As noted earlier, inventors in large companies may be less informed about the value of 
their patents because of the greater organizational distance and more intensive specialisation of 
tasks. As a result, the gap in response should be wider in these firms. Among our 354 French 
patents we distinguished between the patents applied for by the large firms (more than 250 
employees), small-medium firms (less than 250 employees), and universities and other research 
organisations. We found that a slight over-estimation of the inventor’s assessment of the value of 
their patents compared to the managers is produced by inventors in the large firms. The 
difference is smaller for small-medium firms and inventors in academia and other non-profit 
research institutions. See the PatVal-EU Report (2005) for detail.  
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Table 1. The PatVal-EU Survey: targeted number of patents and response rates. Distribution by country. 
 GER SP FR* IT NL UK EU6 
Number of patents whose inventors were 
contacted 10,215 815 4,199 1,857 2,594 7,846 27,531
Number of patents whose inventors responded 3,346 269 1,486 1,250 1,124 1542 9,017 
Response rate (Responses/Contacts) 32.8% 33.0% 35.4% 67.3% 43.3% 19.7% 32.8%
Country share of patents in the final sample 37.1% 3.0% 16.5% 13.9% 12.5% 17.1% 100% 
* The French survey was directed to both inventors and applicant organisations.  
 
Table 2. Composition of the sample by “macro” technological classes and by type of inventors’ employers  
 Large firms 
Medium 
sized 
firms 
Small 
firms 
Private 
Research 
Inst. 
Public 
Research 
Inst. 
University
Other 
Govt 
Inst. 
Others Total 
Electrical Eng. 
(15.8%) 79.9% 5.5% 9.1% 0.4% 1.8% 2.9% 0.1% 0.3% 100% 
Instruments 
(10.9%) 60.4% 7.9% 16.7% 3.2% 3.8% 7.0% 0.1% 0.9% 100% 
Chemicals & 
Pharm (18.5%) 81.1% 4.9% 4.9% 0.6% 2.6% 5.7% 0.1% 0.1% 100% 
Process Eng. 
(24.9%) 64.4% 12.3% 17.2% 0.7% 2.2% 2.4% 0.2% 0.6% 100% 
Mechanical Eng. 
(29.8%) 67.8% 10.5% 17.8% 0.2% 1.1% 1.2% 0.2% 1.2% 100% 
Total (100%) 70.6% 8.8% 13.7% 0.8% 2.0% 3.2% 0.2% 0.7% 100% 
Number of observations = 8,809. The share of patents by technological class (first column) use 9,014 observations.  
 
Table 3. Sex, age and education of inventors. Distribution by technological class.  
 % of female inventors 
Average age of 
inventors* 
% of inventors 
with tertiary 
education 
% of inventors 
with PhD 
degree 
% of inventors 
who changed 
employer after 
innovation 
Electrical Engineering 2.0% 43.3 82.3% 19.1% 27.04% 
Instruments  2.7% 44.6 82.0% 33.4% 25.42% 
Chemicals & Pharm  7.4% 44.5 91.8% 59.1% 19.99% 
Process Engineering 2.1% 46.6 72.7% 22.4% 21.20% 
Mechanical Engineering 1.1% 46.2 66.3% 9.3% 21.54% 
Total 2.8% 45.4 76.9% 26.0% 22.47% 
Number of observations differs across columns, between 8,861 (age) and 8,963 (gender). 
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Table 4. Inventors’ rewards 
 GER SP FR IT NL UK Total 
Average importance of inventors’ rewards 
Monetary rewards 3.0 2.1 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.1 
Career advances and opportunities for 
new/better jobs 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.3 3.0 
Prestige/reputation 3.7 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.7 3.4 
Innovations increase performance of the 
organisation the inventor works for 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.0 
Satisfaction to show that something is 
technically possible 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.9 
Benefits in terms of working conditions as a 
reward by employer 3.0 2.2 1.9 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.6 
Share of inventors who received monetary compensation 
% Monetary compensation 61.3% 14.7% NA* 23.1% 17.5% 28.2% 41.7% 
% Permanent 4.6% 3.2% NA* 5.2% 3.8% 3.2% 4.6% 
% Transitory 56.7% 11.5% NA* 17.9% 13.6% 25.0% 37.1% 
Number of observations differs across rows, between 7,360 (monetary compensation) and 8,424 (satisfaction). 
* France not included because of too many missing data.  
  
Table 5. Research collaborations in the innovation process 
 % co-applied 
patents among 
independent 
organisations 
% co-applied 
patents 
% patents 
with external 
co-inventors 
% patents 
developed in 
collaboration with 
other partners 
% patents 
developed with 
formal 
collaborations 
% patents 
developed with 
informal 
collaborations 
GER 3.1% 5.0% 15.4% 13.3% 9.5% 3.8% 
SP 3.0% 3.4% 9.4% 19.6% 16.9% 2.7% 
FR 5.4% 7.0% 12.3% 22.7% 19.8% 2.9% 
IT 4.0% 4.8% 9.6% 21.9% 14.3% 7.6% 
NL 3.3% 8.2% 15.9% 34.5% 26.9% 7.6% 
UK 2.8% 7.8% 21.1% 23.3% 19.0% 4.3% 
Total 3.6% 6.1% 15.0% 20.5% 15.8% 4.7% 
Number of observations differs across columns, between 8,501 (collaborations) and 9,013 (co-assigned patents). 
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Table 6. Patent use. Distribution by technological class  
  Internal use Licensing 
Cross-
licensing 
Licensing 
& Use 
Blocking 
Competitors 
(unused) 
Sleeping 
Patents 
(unused) 
Total 
Electrical Engineering 49.2% 3.9% 6.1% 3.6% 18.3% 18.9% 100.0%
Instruments  47.5% 9.1% 4.9% 4.3% 14.4% 19.8% 100.0% 
Chemicals & Pharm  37.9% 6.5% 2.6% 2.5% 28.2% 22.3% 100.0% 
Process Engineering 54.6% 7.4% 2.0% 4.9% 15.4% 15.7% 100.0% 
Mechanical Engineering 56.5% 5.8% 1.8% 4.2% 17.4% 14.3% 100.0% 
Total 50.5% 6.4% 3.0% 4.0% 18.7% 17.4% 100.0%
Number of observations = 7,711 
 
Table 7. Patent use. Distribution by inventors’ employer  
 Internal use Licensing 
Cross-
licensing 
Licensing 
& Use 
Blocking 
Competitors 
( d)
Sleeping 
Patents 
( d)
Total 
Large companies 50.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 21.7% 19.1% 100.0%
Medium sized companies 65.6% 5.4% 1.2% 3.6% 13.9% 10.3% 100.0% 
Small companies 55.8% 15.0% 3.9% 6.9% 9.6% 8.8% 100.0% 
Private Research Institutions 16.7% 35.4% 0.0% 6.2% 18.8% 22.9% 100.0% 
Public Research Institutions 21.7% 23.2% 4.3% 5.8% 10.9% 34.1% 100.0% 
Universities 26.2% 22.5% 5.0% 5.0% 13.8% 27.5% 100.0% 
Other Govt. Institutions 41.7% 16.7% 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 25.0% 100.0% 
Other 34.0% 17.0% 4.3% 8.5% 12.8% 23.4% 100.0% 
Total 50.5% 6.2% 3.1% 3.9% 18.8% 17.5% 100.0% 
Number of observations = 7,556 
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Figure 1. Importance of geographical and “organisational” proximity of inventors. Scale: 1 (not important) 
to 5 (very important) 
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Figure 2. Average importance of six sources of knowledge used to develop innovation (Scale 1 to 5)  
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Figure 3. New firm creation from patented innovation. Distribution by country and by technological class  
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Number of observations = 7,391.  
 
Figure 4. The value of European patents across macro technological classes 
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